Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Bail for the Bikers -- Stack v. Boyle II?


Once upon a time in America, government officials arrested 12 persons and charged them with violating the Smith Act, which made it against the law to advocate overthrowing the U.S. government. The Smith Act mostly was used to prosecute communists, anarchists, and fascists – people we didn’t like and who scared us, and these particular 12 people were believed to be communists. A judge, looking at these 12 defendants, set each of their financial conditions of release (some would say their “bail”) at $50,000.

Looking at these bail settings in the 1951 case of Stack v. Boyle, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that they were unlawful. In particular, the judge didn’t take into consideration any individualized factors that help make those bail settings non-arbitrary, the judge apparently based the amount on a single factor – the charge – which the Court expressly said was an arbitrary act, and that the judge didn't consider any evidence so that the amounts would be “reasonably calculated” to provide assurance of court appearance.

In his concurrence, Justice Jackson elaborated a bit. He said that the practice of admission to bail “is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial.” Instead, he wrote, “the spirit of the procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.” When presented with the argument that the bail-setting court fixed uniform blanket sums by merely looking at the charge and not at each defendant, Justice Jackson wrote, “If this occurred, it is a clear violation of [federal law]” and that to assume that each defendant was completely identical to each other defendant at least violated the law of probabilities. When presented with the argument that the bail-setting court used the amounts to keep these communists in jail on purpose, Justice Jackson wrote that such a use “is contrary to the whole policy and philosophy of bail.” In fact, we now have appellate court opinions that clearly state that setting bail with a purpose to detain people is unlawful.

Fast forward to this week, when government officials arrested 170 people in Texas and charged them with engaging in organized crime. When we use that charge, we mostly go after people we don’t like and who scare us, and these particular people happened to be in motorcycle gangs. A judge, looking at these 170 defendants, set each of their financial conditions of release (some would say their “bail”) at $1 million. You see where I’m going here, and it doesn’t take a genius to notice the similarities between one of our biggest bail cases in America from 1951 and what happened this week in Waco.

Honestly, if our own judges can’t keep track of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, how are we to improve? Today, we actually know how to deal with extremely high risk defendants. And if any – or all – of these defendants are extremely high risk, then they should be detained without bail. But if they’re high risk, setting money bail to detain them is not the answer.  

I’m weary of explaining why. That hasn’t always the case, as usually the explanation is a new thing to judges, who aren’t necessarily trained in social science research, statistics, or other fundamentals of bail that don’t deal with the law. But I shouldn’t have to explain to a judge what the U.S. Supreme Court has said, or is likely to say, about how to set bail.

The history and the law tell us that both bail (release) and no bail (detention) are lawful if you do them right. In this single act of setting 170 identical financial conditions, this judge simultaneously did both bail and no bail wrong.


     

Thursday, May 7, 2015

Baltimore Kid Faces Life -- What About the Judge?



Did you hear the one about the 18-year-old kid who bashes a car windshield in Baltimore with a plastic cone, turns himself in, and the judge sets his financial condition of bond at $500,000?


Judges can only set conditions of release for two constitutionally valid purposes – court appearance and public safety. Now, since the kid turned himself in, we have to assume he wasn’t the biggest flight risk, so what about public safety? Well, the problem with public safety is that in virtually every state, Maryland included, you either can’t forfeit a financial condition for new crimes or the law allows a surety to be exonerated from any forfeiture so long as the defendant is in custody. Setting money for public safety when you don’t lose the money for breaches in public safety is irrational, and thus likely unlawful under multiple theories of law that require, at a minimum, rationality by the government. Moreover, after decades of research, we have never shown any link between money on a bail bond and public safety. Quite simply, money won’t keep you safe.

So why $500,000? Was it to punish the kid? If so, it was unconstitutional. Was it to teach him or others a lesson? If so, it was unconstitutional. Was it to keep him in jail? If so, it was unconstitutional. Was he given any kind of a decent due process hearing before being detained through an unattainable release condition? If not, it was unconstitutional.

Which raises the important question; what do we do when judges violate the law? We’re pretty keen on making sure everyone else pays when they violate the law. For example, this kid faces life in prison for breaking that windshield. But what about the judge? Is it too much to ask that judges simply follow the United States Constitution? And what should we do when they don’t? 

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

Cameras Aren't the Answer

I’m taking a quick break from bail to weigh in on the current, seemingly endless series of incidents concerning law enforcement officers and the public, one of the latest occurring during an undercover sting where I used to live in Tulsa, Oklahoma. A lot of people are rightfully concerned that without cameras, we wouldn’t even hear about a lot of the incidents, like the one in North Charleston, South Carolina, when the officer shot Walter Scott eight times in the back.    

Yeah, it was a good thing somebody had a camera at the scene, because it appears that the officer in South Carolina was getting ready to say something like, “He took my Taser, and so I feared that he posed a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm to others.” These days, you can shoot a guy in the back and get away with it if you say the right thing afterward.

But more cameras, including body cameras on the officers themselves, aren’t the answer. Instead, the answer to restoring the relationship between law enforcement and the people they serve in America is a complete overhaul of practically everything that the officers currently do.

Police departments and other law enforcement entities should start with their mission statements, re-drafting them with the help of citizens so as to memorialize the contract that allows them to carry and use deadly weapons on our streets. Interacting with citizens has to be positive for everyone. I know a police department today that actually punishes its officers by making them work at the department’s front desk where the public comes to ask questions. So when officers screw up in that department, their punishment is to interact with people. How messed up is that? I’ve been to that front desk, and the people working there aren’t the happiest campers on the playground. The whole thing is a fundamental disconnect between the police and the people they serve.   
Law enforcement should also completely change its hiring practices – I know another police department in Colorado that didn’t want to hire ex-military or people with law enforcement experience; instead, it hired waiters, who knew how to serve, and then taught those waiters how to be police. The relationship between the police and the public in that town, by the way, is exemplary.  

Law enforcement should completely change its training, too; the current method of training that involves giving orders and ratcheting up the response based on the amount of resistance to those orders is simply not working. Police and other officers must be taught to diffuse environments, to occasionally back away, and to understand the overall perspective of the situation.   

Finally, law enforcement should change its primary focus, which over the decades has slowly drifted from protecting the public to protecting the officers. This isn’t the first time that we’ve had to question our fixation with officer safety. After Columbine, we recognized that officer safety was secondary to saving people’s lives in an active shooter scenario. Quite frankly, if we’re all that concerned with officer safety, we really shouldn’t allow undercover sting operations to begin with. They’re pretty dangerous.

If I were younger and wanted to create a social science theory describing what people wanted in their police forces, I would call it “the Matt Dillon Theory” of law enforcement. If you’ve ever watched Gunsmoke, then you know that Matt often ran headlong into danger to help people. He faced the bad guys upright and played by the rules. Occasionally, he’d have to shoot it out with them, but only if they’d been warned and decided to shoot Matt first. He never shot women (hey, it was the 50s), drunks, or kids. And he never, and I mean never, shot anyone in the back. In my opinion, that’s the kind of law enforcement officers we all want. What we have, instead, is pretty far from it.


I like cops – I know a lot of cops, and I used to work with cops when I wrote about a billion parking tickets back in the day – but I can’t ignore what’s going on. The biggest public backlashes we get in America are when single incidents reinforce and amplify the public’s notions about what they already believe. The fact that people are taking to the streets to protest these single incidents is because the people generally believe all officers are angry, power hungry control freaks looking for a fight. It’s going to take more than body cameras to change that perception.   

Monday, April 13, 2015

Harvard Law Review Forum Article

The Harvard Law Review Forum just published the article, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of American Lawyers. It is written by Alec Karakatsanis (Equal Justice Under Law), a new friend to pretrial justice, and one of those guys with his feet firmly planted inside court houses in places like Ferguson, Missouri, Clanton, Alabama, and North Charleston, South Carolina.

It touches briefly on the quote from the United States Supreme Court, "In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception," and thus the paper reminds us that a big part of pretrial justice is simply figuring out how to make this statement a reality. 


I know Alec, and therefore I know that even though he uses the term “failure,” he means it to inspire the kind of work that only the legal profession can do. I’m a fourth generation lawyer, and I take no offense. 

Friday, April 10, 2015

Bail -- Accountability Matters?


A few weeks ago, the bail insurance lobbyists wrote that bail isn’t about money. Now they do a bit of a turnaround and say that bail is about money – well, it’s about making a profit at least, something of which they’re quite proud. Holy smokes. First there’s no presumption of innocence – then there is a presumption of innocence. First it’s not about money – and then it is about money. I wish these guys would read their own memos.  

Okay, so now they’re openly proud about the fact that they make their money through the criminal justice system, so let’s take a look at that. Personally, I would like nothing more than ultimately to eliminate my own job; indeed, if my job is gone (and I use the term “job” loosely, as I rarely get paid), that means we’ve eliminated crime and thus the need for police, jails, and courts. I’m pretty sure the bail insurance company lobbyists don’t think that way, though. I’ve often said that if those guys were allowed to run things, they’d actually be thinking of ways to increase crime. They really, really like their jobs, they don’t consider them to be a necessary evil, and they’re proud to think of them like they’re any other job – like dry cleaners and accountants.  

But let’s be clear – when the insurance lobbyists say that people in the commercial bail industry actually work for a living, they have to mean the bail agents, and not themselves. And if they say that being in the commercial bail industry is just like having any other job that makes money – like dry cleaners and accountants – they definitely must mean the agents and can’t possibly mean themselves. Like dry cleaners and accountants, bail agents at least actually do something in this world. Bail insurance companies, on the other hand, don’t do a thing for their money. Instead, they rely on other people to make if for them, they don’t care how it’s made (like, they could care less if making money means that you or your family stay in jail because you can’t afford a bail agent), and they’ll fight like crazy if you try to take that money away from them through the law or even through a forfeiture. Bail insurance companies are like the Mafia – they have bail bondsmen do all the work and then force those bondsmen to dump sacks of money on the insurance companies’ doorstep.

It’s a great deal for insurance companies, but here’s the rub: bail insurance companies have to keep the agents happy. And right now that means telling them just about anything to make them think that their industry isn’t in grave danger of disappearing. Bail insurance companies don’t advertise to the public about bail insurance. A lot of them don’t even list it as something they do on their websites. But they need agents to fight their fights – to keep on repeating what the insurance companies tell them to repeat so that the money continues to roll in. That’s why we see posts on insurance company websites talking about how proud everyone is, and posts like this last one, which tries, once again, to make the case as to why surety bonds are so great. But like most things, the insurance companies aren’t giving the bail agents the whole scoop. If they did, those agents might actually switch to another company, or, heaven forbid, start to imagine a world without insurance company backing.

In the latest post, the insurance companies are basically telling the agents to keep on fighting for the current surety bond system because that system is (1) effective, (2) efficient, and (3) makes people accountable. They’re not telling those agents the flip side, though, and so, if you’re a bail agent, you should at least know what I tell people about those same three things.  

As for effectiveness, the insurance company lobbyists typically say that certain studies and DOJ data say that release on a surety bond is more effective than release any other way. As I’ve written before, however, the studies they use (and that they want the agents to repeat) are flawed in that most of them are using the DOJ data improperly – indeed, DOJ itself had to warn everybody against doing exactly what the insurance companies are doing with these studies and data.

The studies are flawed for various reasons, but the biggest, in my opinion, is that they only talk about whether a surety bond is effective at getting someone back to court, and that simply isn’t enough at bail.

At bail, we try to accomplish three things: (1) maximize release, while we (2) maximize public safety and (3) maximize court appearance. These purposes are given to us through the law, which is intertwined with the history of bail. Unlike other and perhaps simpler areas of the law, however, these underlying purposes are competing – you have to try to release people, but then you have to worry about what they do once you release them – and thus they present a balance. And here’s the important thing: because you must balance them, you can never only discuss one without the others.

For example, if someone says, “I have a way to achieve 99% public safety and court appearance rates,” the law requires that you ask what that method does to release rates (in fact, about the only way to get such high rates is to detain virtually all defendants, which the law wouldn’t allow). Likewise, if someone says, “I have a way to release more bailable defendants from jail,” you have to ask, “Well, what does that release method do to public safety and court appearance rates?”

By far, the biggest problem with the “studies” that the insurance companies use to show their effectiveness is that they only look at what release on a surety bond does for court appearance. So even if the studies weren’t flawed, you’d still have to ask, “Well, what does a surety bond do for public safety and release rates?” And this is where surety bonds fail, because they do absolutely nothing for public safety (you can’t even forfeit the money on a bail bond for new crimes), and they tend to detain a lot of people who can’t pay the fees or post the collateral to use them. In fact, if you do the math on a group of 100 felony defendants, you’ll see that for the two or three defendants released on a surety bond who skip court and are returned “because bondsmen are out looking for them,” about 28 defendants are detained because they can’t pay the money. In short, surety bonds are only really effective at keeping people in jail. Does the threat of being tracked down by a bondsman cause fewer people to skip court to begin with? Nope, not according to the research.

As for efficiency, the insurance company lobbyists typically say that surety bonds get people back to court because bondsmen go out and get them when they skip. Those lobbyists said this very thing here in Colorado, but all the sheriffs and police officers that I knew said the opposite – they said the bondsmen never really go out and get defendants, and that it’s usually sheriff’s deputies or police officers who find them. Because I and my colleagues were researchers, we actually looked into this question, and for three months we studied how all defendants who had failed to appear for court were returned. The result? Well, as you might imagine, about half of the defendants came back on their own. Virtually all of the rest were brought in by deputies or officers. Less than ½ of 1% were brought in by bail bondsmen or bounty hunters. The fact that bondsmen don’t actually go out and get defendants, combined with the facts that surety bonds have nothing to do with public safety and tend to hinder release, mean that surety bonds are about the least efficient method of release you can think of.

As for accountability, all these previous points show that you don’t get any sort of accountability by using a surety bond. Like I said, for-profit sureties and insurance companies aren’t accountable for public safety – you can’t forfeit the money on a bail bond for new crimes, and so bondsmen don’t really care if a defendant is high risk to commit new crimes. In fact, a defendant who continually commits crimes but keeps coming to court is a bondsman’s best customer. So long as the judge plays along and keeps releasing that defendant on higher and higher amounts, commercial sureties make out like bandits.  

Likewise, for-profit sureties and insurance companies aren’t accountable for release – for-profit sureties can essentially decide that a defendant will stay in jail for any number of reasons, or for no reason at all. And, because they get their fee up front, typically collateralize the rest of the financial obligation, don’t bother tracking anyone down, and fight courts to keep from paying forfeitures, you can’t even say they’re accountable for the one thing they claim to do, which is getting people back to court. Out of the three lawful purposes underlying the bail transaction, commercial sureties admit (but try to get you to ignore the fact) that really they only care about one.

Created in America just about 1900, for-profit bail bondsmen (and later the layer of profit-driven insurance companies) are a relatively recent phenomenon in the 1,500 year history of bail. Nevertheless, ever since its creation, that overall system – for profit sureties administering mostly secured money bonds – has led essentially to the same basic problem for over 100 years – the unnecessary detention of bailable defendants. For centuries in both England and America we employed a system of bail that used uncompensated personal sureties administering mostly unsecured bonds, meaning that nobody had to pay anything up front to get out of jail. We have the ability to re-create that system by using pretrial services agency supervision (or supervision through other entities such as probation departments), and simply switching from secured to unsecured bonds. The only problem with this solution is that it leaves no place for bail insurance company lobbyists. And since they probably don’t want to actually dry clean your clothes or do your taxes for a living, I think we can expect a fight.  

Monday, March 16, 2015

Bail – It’s Not About the Money?




Well, I read the latest installment from the bail insurance people – you know, the ones who want to keep our current system of bail in place so they can make boatloads of money – and they make the case for why bail isn’t about the money at all; instead, apparently, it’s about influence.

They’re right to a degree. Bail shouldn’t be about money. Bail is all about release, and money is simply the one condition of many that, uniquely and unfortunately, tends to stand in the way of the actual release of bailable defendants. But I think what the insurance company lobbyists are getting at is the idea that money isn’t such a big deal to them – to the commercial surety industry.

The only problem with that argument is the fact that money is really kind of a huge deal to the commercial surety industry. In fact, it’s such a big deal that if a defendant doesn’t have any money, the industry won’t even help him or her out. It’s such a big deal that if a jurisdiction decides to follow the law and the evidence and promote the release on recognizance or on “unsecured” financial conditions (the kind that don’t produce any kind of profit), the bail insurance companies send in lawyers to block those improvements or even to pass bills designed to force judges to use more money. It’s such a big deal that the commercial bail industry spends a ton of time trying to figure out ways not to pay back any money once they’re involved. And it’s such a big deal that the insurance companies will do just about anything – pay for research, send out armies of lobbyists, and mislead government officials and private funders just to keep the flow of money streaming in (in a recent Mother Jones article, a bail lobbyist bragged that they have never had to cover any loss; apparently, they leave payment of the losses to defendants, their families, and the bail agents.) They make sure the laws only allow for forfeiture for court appearance and not public safety, and they continue to tell their bail agents all kinds of factual distortions to keep those bondsmen from recognizing why their businesses are ultimately going to fail.

In the article that I read, the insurance company also says that public pretrial services agencies simply don’t have “skin in the game,” or influence. They forget to point out that these agencies play a crucial role in the pretrial phase that has grown up around a commercial bail industry that has refused to change. Pretrial agencies supervise for both court appearance and public safety (yes, insurance companies, there are two constitutionally valid purposes for limiting one’s pretrial freedom, and if you set conditions to protect the public, you need someone to make sure those conditions are followed).

And, what’s this whole “skin in the game” thing? I mean, it’s actually a pretrial services officer’s job to do these things. It’s like telling a cop that he really can’t do an effective job as a police officer because he’s going to be paid whether he fights crime or not. And, by the way, the insurance companies have apparently forgotten about the history of bail, which illustrates massive debates during their creation over the fact that bondsmen lose all sense of accountability and responsibility once the defendant pays a fee or indemnifies the surety. Basically that’s the main reason why no other country has allowed commercial bail bondsmen to exist. We did it in America because we didn’t have any better alternatives, and we misunderstood how secured bonds would end up detaining just as many people in the future as the system we’d been using before.   

I talk to bail agents every now and then, and every time I do I tell them that the future of commercial bail or “private pretrial release” – if it exists at all – will look dramatically different than the current system. For one, the bail agents would have to supervise for court appearance and public safety; they’d have to take all comers; and although they might be able to charge a fee for service that would cover the cost of supervision, they’d have to stop relying on these arbitrary amounts of financial conditions that don’t have anything to do with court appearance and public safety.

In fact, between you and me, bail agents, the insurance companies aren’t doing you any favors these days. I’ll give you just one example – the insurance companies continually tell you to cite to certain DOJ data to say that surety bonds are superior to other forms of releases. Unfortunately, DOJ itself – yes the same entity that produced the data – has said that you can’t do that. So as soon as you cite the data, someone like me goes in and shows people the official DOJ stance that contradicts everything you just said. The insurance companies know about the DOJ stance, because it’s in a published advisory and they complained about it mightily when it came out. But they just won’t tell you bondsmen about it. It works better for them to have you go in and cite to bad research in the off chance that it might work. Bottom line – if you bail agents continue to allow the insurance companies to strategize your future, you won’t have one.

In fact, any decent improvement in bail in America leaves out the insurance companies, which only have a stake in a system with high, arbitrary money amounts that, even when forfeited, never affect their profits. They say that bail is all about “influence,” but frankly, the only influence the insurance companies care about is the kind of back-room and oily influence they have over legislatures other public officials. The good news is that all of that’s starting to change.

Finally, because the insurance lobbyists think we don’t know anything about the purpose of pretrial release, let’s review. Historically and legally, bail is release, just as “no bail” is detention. The purpose of bail up until the Normans invaded England was to avoid blood feuds, but as soon as the Normans started building jails and holding folks until judges showed up for court, the purpose of bail quickly became to release people and it's stayed that way ever since. So it’s easy: the purpose of bail is to release people, and the purpose of no bail is to detain people. Compare those purposes to the purposes of conditions of bail or release, that is, limitations on pretrial freedom. Those purposes are court appearance and public safety, currently the only two constitutionally valid purposes for limiting release.

The bail insurance companies typically say that, “The purpose of bail is court appearance.” What they mean is that the purpose of money – or one condition of bail – is court appearance, because money can only be forfeited for failure to appear for court, and bondsmen and bail insurance companies only deal in money. They have confused bail – a process of release – with one of its conditions. They don’t talk about public safety because bail insurance companies are not in the business of public safety, and so they don’t really care if a defendant commits a crime while on pretrial release. When the Supreme Court recognized public safety as a valid purpose for limiting pretrial freedom, the bail insurance people didn’t evolve to take that into consideration. I’m not sure why, but it seems like maybe they just didn’t want the extra work of trying to supervise for public safety. I mean, that takes a bit of work, right? And why work when you can get your money for nothing? Finally, the insurance companies don’t really care about release because their system of requiring payment prior to release actually causes a lot of detention. They say there’s no such thing as a bailable defendant stuck in jail because he or she can’t pay the money to get out, but that’s just dumb.


Bail is, in fact, all about money right now. Give it five years, though, because that’s going to change.       

Monday, March 2, 2015

If You’re Writing About Excessive Bail . . .




If you’re writing about excessive bail, I hope you’ll read this quick blog, which may give you some idea of how we're changing the typical excessive bail narrative.

For over 100 years, when they have actually addressed it, judges have been deciding excessive bail cases only one way. They take the amount – typically, a really high and arbitrary amount – and they compare that amount to other, equally arbitrary amounts in similar cases. The idea of deciding whether the amount is “reasonable” allows them to do this kind of fact-based analysis, and virtually all state supreme courts have said that excessive bail is defined as unreasonable bail.

The absurdity of this kind of analysis, however, is readily apparent by the fact that we actually have ALR articles that try to compile excessive bail cases, and those articles will often limit their compilation to, for example, “cases over $500,000,”  as if a set sum can adequately delineate where the proper analysis of reasonableness or excessiveness can actually begin.

Now, however, there's a movement to analyze excessive bail cases differently, and it doesn’t involve any radical changes; indeed, it only involves getting back to the basics of the test for excessiveness itself.

First, though, realize that any excessive bail discussion can now rightfully include both federal and state law in the same document. Whereas once bail scholars used to debate whether the bail clause of the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was “incorporated” against the states, now everyone seems to agree that the Supreme Court believes that it is. Your cite on this point will be a bit strange, however, as you’ll likely be citing to footnote 12 in McDonald v. Chicago, a Second Amendment case, and that footnote’s reference to Schilb v. Kuebel as your authority.  Even so, it’s a big deal, because now at least you have a decent federal standard to work with.

That standard comes from United States v. Salerno, in which the Supreme Court said that excessive bail involves a balancing test – i.e., balancing the government’s proposed conditions of release or detention with the perceived evil, or lawful purpose. This test, alone, opens the door to many more excessive bail arguments, once you realize that conditions or bail, or limitations on pretrial freedom, may include more than just financial conditions, and may only lawfully have one of two purposes – court appearance or public safety. This last requirement is extremely important. Bail set to punish is an unlawful purpose, and bail set to detain is equally unlawful. It’s like setting bail to impress your friends. That seems absurd, but we need to start thinking of conditions of bail (i.e., release) set to detain someone as being equally absurd and unlawful.

If you’re writing about excessive bail, realize, too, that since virtually every state defines excessive bail as “unreasonable,” we now have some pretty good research showing that secured money in most, if not all cases, is excessive because it's unreasonable. For example, we have research showing that setting an unsecured financial condition will get you the exact same results for public safety and court appearance as setting a secured financial condition, but will lead to less unnecessary detention. If you get the same results from a less restrictive condition, it simply wouldn’t be reasonable to set the more restrictive one, and thus the more restrictive condition should be deemed excessive. The essence of the Excessive Bail Clause is to keep the government from doing things to defendants “just to make sure.” Setting a secured financial condition violates the Clause, however, by exceeding the standard for setting conditions generally, which is that they can only be set to provide “reasonable assurance” or either public safety or court appearance, and not complete assurance or even “extra assurance.”

Basically, any research that shows that any condition of release doesn’t work – that is, that the condition doesn’t further the lawful purposes of bail – would argue for that condition to be declared unreasonable and thus excessive. But in bail, we have even more important research to help us. We now have research showing that if a judge sets a secured financial condition of release on a lower risk defendant, and if that lower risk defendant stays in jail due to his or her inability to find the money, bad things start to happen. In fact, the longer they stay in jail, the more likely they are to harm the public and not to come back to court. Now, if you’re a judge setting a condition of release to protect the public and get someone to return to court, would it be reasonable to set a condition of release that ended up doing the opposite of what you intended? Absolutely not. Would it thus be excessive? Absolutely. 

Finally, if you’re writing about excessive bail, you’re going to have to deal with what I call the “unfortunate line of cases,” which is that line of cases that says, essentially, a financial condition isn’t excessive simply because someone can’t afford it. This line of cases is unfortunate because it's a complete aberration to the legal and historical notion that bail should equal release. The line was created at a time in America when we were running out of personal sureties, and we had not yet tried commercial sureties. We had tons of bailable defendants being detained unintentionally due to their lack of sureties and their inability to afford the financial condition themselves. Apparently, back then, judges were pretty skittish about flat-out releasing all bailable defendants (even though we had been doing that very thing for the thousand-year period before), and they didn’t have any other alternatives – i.e., no supervision, no risk assessment, no non-financial conditions of release, no research, etc., to alleviate their concerns. The fact is, though, today we have all the things necessary to encourage judges or legislatures to completely overturn this entire line of cases. Indeed, the cases have been overturned through the enactment of a single sentence in both the D.C. and federal bail statutes, which both say, essentially, that money cannot result in the pretrial detention of the defendant.


Bail reform in America means that we have to get back to basics in our legal foundations. Just remember that if something is unfair, unreasonable, irrational, or arbitrary, it’s likely unlawful. Because money at bail is all of these things, it’s simply a matter of time before it’s gone.