I'm just adding this post to, once again, remind everyone that there are certain issues a state must examine before deciding to change a constitutional right to bail provision, just as there are issues that a state must address when changing them. Whatever a state does to a constitutional right to bail provision involves drawing a line between release and detention, and that requires legal justification.
My latest paper provides a model for states that are asking: (1) whether to change their right to bail provision; and (2) if so, to what? More importantly, it shows how to legally justify the change.
Here it is, called "Model Bail Laws." It assumes that the reader will read Fundamentals of Bail and Money as a Criminal Justice Stakeholder first, and those are cited early on in the Model Bail Laws paper.
Once again, if a state changes its right to bail provision, it will need to legally justify it. The only way to do that is to work through the issues presented in the model in the paper. I don't require states to necessarily adopt my model, but courts will require that they justify theirs much like I justified mine. If they don't, the new provisions run a real risk of being struck through any number of legal theories.
Not to get too complicated, but the same issues that go into changing a bail provision will illuminate the fact that many existing detention provisions are currently unlawful, simply because those provisions were likely justified through assumptions that are false today.
The model in my paper is kind of long and a bit complex, but if anyone calls I'll help to explain it.
Showing posts with label pretrial release. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pretrial release. Show all posts
Sunday, December 17, 2017
Tuesday, April 5, 2016
The One Thing Missing From The Bail Reform Debate – The Truth?
Okay, this should be easy. A
bail insurance company listed a bunch of “truths,” which makes it easy for me
to grade them on their own truthfulness.
Insurance Company Truth 1: “Pretrial Release is not about letting people out of
jail . . . It is about ensuring that they show up for court.”
First, saying that “pretrial
release” is not about releasing people pretrial sounds pretty dumb, but I think
I know what he means. He means bail, and this is actually false for the reasons
I wrote about a couple of weeks ago. He needs to read my two papers, Fundamentals of Bail, and Money as a Criminal Justice Stakeholder.
Ever since the Norman Invasion, bail has always been about release.
Grade: D, but only because court
appearance is a constitutionally
valid purpose for limiting release.
Insurance Company Truth 2: “The Current System of Financially Secured Release
is Absolutely a Risk Based System.”
This is actually true, but it
doesn’t mean that the current system isn’t screwed up. Risk is inherent in
bail, we’ve been assessing risk at bail since 400 A.D., and we’re getting
better and better at it all the time. So, technically speaking, even though currently
we tend to just look at some guy’s charge and set an amount of money hoping
some bail agent might help, that’s actually a very basic and flawed way to deal
with risk. And, yes, insurance companies deal with risk at bail, too, even if
they never actually pay out. But stepping back a bit, we see the big flaw with
the model we set up about 1900 in America. Looking at someone’s charge, setting
some arbitrary amount of money, and then waiting to see what happens is a lousy
way to do pretrial release and detention, and an equally lousy way to deal with
the risk that’s inherent in bail.
By the way, even though
insurance companies deal with risk all the time by using actuarial risk
instruments, the bail insurance companies have gone on record to say that gut instinct
is better than actuarial instruments in bail. I got on them pretty fast for that
one, so they may have taken it back.
Grade: C -
Insurance Company Truth 3:
“People are not in jail because they are poor
. . . they are in jail because of probable cause and they are accused of
breaking the law.”
Technically, people are
arrested only after a finding of probable cause, and even then they don’t have
to be transported to jail. But he’s sort of right – people don’t initially go
to jail because of bail. They just stay in jail because of bail. That’s one big
reason why we’re having a bail reform movement.
Grade: D -, mostly due to the
warped idea that people who can’t afford the amount somehow belong in jail.
Insurance Company Truth 4: “Financially secured release is the most effective
way to assure appearance in court . . . release through a public sector pretrial
program is one of the least effective methods.”
This is totally wrong, mostly
for the reasons I stated last week dealing with the data issue. But look at it
this way. What if surety bonds were
the best way to deal with court appearance? They still have nothing to do with
public safety, and they really, really screw up release. I once did the
numbers. If you take 100 felony defendants and look at what happens to them,
you see that about 2 or 3 will be released on a surety bond and skip court. The
argument is this: “Since we go out and get those 2 or 3, the others on a surety
bond are afraid to skip, and so we maximize court appearance.” The problem is
that even if that’s true (it’s not – but that’s the subject of another blog), by
placing a surety bond on everyone, 27 or 28 of those 100 defendants will be
detained due to money. Bail requires us to balance release with public safety
and court appearance. A thing – such as a surety bond – that does nothing for
public safety and that screws up release fails in that balance.
Grade: F
Insurance Company Truth 5: "The defendant is not the victim."
This is true.
Grade: C because he got it
right, but for all the wrong reasons. Saying we’re treating defendants like
victims simply because we think jurisdictions should follow their constitutions
is pretty lame. Moreover, it’s okay to want to help victims, but not because you
think the defendants are already guilty. It’s like saying that certain people
should be treated with dignity (which is true), but only because everyone else
sucks. If you don’t like criminals, man, get into sentencing. That’s where the
action is.
Tuesday, February 2, 2016
Bail Reform: Bully Activism at its Best?
Leave it to a bail insurance
company to get so many basic things about bail utterly wrong. In a recent post
on one of the main bail insurance sites, the company was bemoaning the recent
federal lawsuits against money bail. In doing so, however, it makes a few
fairly incredible misstatements that I can’t let go without comment.
First, the insurance company tries
to justify bail schedules by talking about how fair and “well thought out” they
are. I’ve written extensively about bail schedules, studied bail schedules from
across the country, and attended those meetings with the judges and others who
create them, and the idea of a bail schedule being anything less than arbitrary
and completely irrational is ludicrous. In my jurisdiction, the people who
created the schedule picked money amounts out of a hat – no one could even
remember what numbers started the whole thing off. And when I looked at all the
other schedules here and in other states, I found the same thing. Arbitrary
numbers, which were occasionally raised to account for inflation or perhaps
headlines, with nobody having any idea about where the amounts even came
from.
In fact, to say that the
numbers are arbitrary is an understatement. I’ve seen and written about
jurisdictions that have doubled every amount on their schedule in blanket fashion, and
jurisdictions that halved every amount. Back in the 1920s, bail researcher
Arthur Beeley wrote that the fact that the numbers were round numbers – like
5,000 or 10,000 – hinted at their arbitrariness. And he’s right. In fact, until
you can argue rationally why $5,000 is the proper amount for an assault, when
$4763.47 isn’t (without considering the individual characteristics of a
particular defendant, and beyond questioning the 5,000 for other constitutional flaws), you’re just making both of them up. Fortunately in my
jurisdiction, the judges eliminated the schedule without being sued, and they
did it because the schedule was unfair, irrational, arbitrary, and the
antithesis of the kind of individualized bail setting that had any hope of following
the constitution. Yes, schedules are often created for benevolent purposes –
I’ve written about this, too. But you aren’t paying attention if you haven’t noticed
that they frequently evolve into unwieldly beasts that tend to keep more people
in jail than out. Our old schedule was nearly 40 pages long, and I’ve seen them as
long as 90, but some of the worst just list two numbers – one for all felonies
and one for all misdemeanors. Overall, bail schedules are just another
manifestation of a flawed and likely unconstitutional money-based bail system,
but they have additional issues that make their extinction even more likely.
Second, the insurance company
says that bail “is not about release.” Now I would think an entity making money
from bail would know something about bail, but apparently not here. If you look
deep into the history of bail you will see that the purpose of bail prior to
the Norman Invasion was to avoid blood feuds. With the Normans, however, came
an entirely new criminal justice system along with the building of jails, and from
that moment on the purpose of bail forever shifted to provide a mechanism of
release from those jails. Yes, court appearance was a legitimate purpose for
setting financial conditions of release, but historically – both in England and
America until the 1800s – those financial conditions were virtually always “unsecured”
conditions, which meant that nobody had to pay anything up-front to get out of
jail. In the 1800s, we ran out of personal sureties, flirted with secured cash
conditions, and then ultimately tried the commercial surety business as a way
to get bailable defendants out of jail. It didn’t work, which is why we’re here
today. Bottom line, though, is that since the creation of jails, bail has always been about release. In 1951, the U.S.
Supreme Court equated the right to bail with the “right to release before
trial,” and “the right to freedom before conviction.” Is it any clearer than
that?
By the way, whenever an
insurance company says that “bail is only about court appearance,” it’s showing
its ignorance not only of what bail is and is not (it’s a mechanism of release,
and it’s not money, which is a condition of release), but also of how bail has
evolved to allow for release with conditions to provide reasonable assurance of
both court appearance and public safety. The
bail insurance companies’ complete disregard of safety as a legitimate public
concern is one reason why we’re seeing bail reform to begin with.
Third, the insurance company writes
that the idea that money bail might discriminate against the poor “couldn’t be
further from the truth.” As my dear friend’s delightful middle school daughter
might respond, “OMG!” Doesn’t discriminate against the poor?! Are you nuts? It’s
a money-based system, for goodness sake. Bail agents only help defendants with
money. If defendants have money, they get out. If they don’t have money, they stay
in. Really, this is something a child in grade school would know.
And arguing that the money
bail system doesn’t discriminate against the poor because so many poor people
rely on the bail industry is like saying that separate but equal eating
establishments weren’t discriminatory because all of the people eating in the
“colored” restaurants were African Americans. I’m not trying to shock or offend
by using a racial analogy, but I’m using it on purpose because in the post that
I read, the insurance company not only made that argument – it also had the enormous
audacity to write that money bail “supports racial and socioeconomic equalities.”
That’s monumentally false, and anyone who believes it really has no place in
criminal justice.
Overall, the insurance
company piece provides a trifecta of fundamentally wrong statements about bail,
leading me to conclude that this particuar company might be better suited to discuss something like
health insurance. Or whole life. And, as usual, the way this goes is that once
the insurance company makes wrong statements, people everywhere start
correcting those statements. This not only makes them look bad, it also makes every single bail agent out there look bad, too. I hope it's just ignorance. Heaven help them if they're saying all this just to make money.
Thursday, November 13, 2014
Warnings from the Appellate Courts
I don't have much time to devote to two really significant cases in bail, but let me start with the fact that it's pretty incredible to have two really significant cases in bail in such a short time. We're in that part of the third generation of bail reform where we're seeing changes, and big-time cases and opinions are part of those changes. They're only going to keep coming, and so I offer up this post as a couple of warnings from the appellate courts.
The first case is the Valenzuela case out of the Ninth Circuit. In that case, the en banc court struck down Arizona's Proposition 100, which amended the state constitution to preclude bail for certain felony offenses if the person charged was deemed to be in the country illegally. There's a lot of political drama concerning the immigration issue in this case, and frankly I'm not sure how it will all flesh out, but I only want to highlight one important thing -- in this opinion, the Ninth Circuit basically held up Arizona's state bail laws and practices against the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Salerno and found those laws and practices lacking. This is a big deal, as I -- along with a number of others concerned with how bail has evolved in America -- have been preaching that the states have been ignoring the lessons of Salerno ever since it was issued. Accordingly, this is the first warning: if appellate courts begin to hold up state bail laws or practices -- such as blanket denials of bail without due process or detaining bailable defendants by using money -- against Salerno, then we're going to see a bunch of states having to change those laws and practices based on federal constitutional law.
The second case is State v. Brown, in which the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision to keep an unattainable financial condition of bond ($250,000) intact, and ordering the release of the defendant on non-monetary conditions. The number of fascinating quotes, cites, and other interesting parts of this opinion are too numerous to list, but a smattering include:equating the term "bail" to pretrial release, the only definition that can be defended legally and historically; citing to Duker, De Haas, Carbone, Freed & Wald, Beeley, Goldfarb, Thomas, and Foote to bolster the court's historical analysis; citing to Devine to explain how all other countries have avoided commercial sureties; citing to Pannel's "keys to the jail" quote; explaining the Manhattan Bail Project; citing to various important bail researchers, including Cohen & Reaves, VanNostrand, Goldkamp, Bechtel, Clark, Jones, & Levin; citing the American Bar Association Standards; explaining how analyzing bail in New Mexico starts with a determination of "bail" and "no bail;" quoting Stack v. Boyle for the requirement of individualization at bail; rejecting so-called "standard bonds;" quoting Bandy to say that setting a financial condition to detain would be unconstitutional; and quoting Justice Jackson's concurrence in Stack to remind judges that we must embrace the risk that is inherent in bail as the price of our system of justice. You really have to read this one to believe it, and especially the last paragraph, in which the court cautions judges to "faithfully honor the rule of law," whatever the consequences.
Brown signals a clear break from the kinds of bail opinions we've grown accustomed to in America. Here we have a state supreme court opinion that uses equal parts of bail’s history, the law, the pretrial research, and the national best-practice pretrial standards to articulate how, at least in New Mexico, setting bail arbitrarily, irrationally, or unfairly will no longer be tolerated. I expect more opinions like Brown in this generation of pretrial reform. And thus, this is the second warning: states that have grown averse to taking the risks that are inherent in America’s system of bail, or accustomed to bad pretrial practices like using “standard bail amounts,” setting money to protect public safety, setting money amounts with a purpose to detain bailable defendants, and basing the bail decision on single factor such as top charge, will likely be forced to change.
As a final point, consider this: in Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not send the case back to have the trial court set a different or a lower amount of money. In the end, the court ordered the defendant's release on no money whatsoever. It's a subtle point, but worth noting, that if a court, like this court, understands the fundamentals of bail, there won't be much room left for money.
I'll stick the two cases on my website, which you can find at www.clebp.org.
The first case is the Valenzuela case out of the Ninth Circuit. In that case, the en banc court struck down Arizona's Proposition 100, which amended the state constitution to preclude bail for certain felony offenses if the person charged was deemed to be in the country illegally. There's a lot of political drama concerning the immigration issue in this case, and frankly I'm not sure how it will all flesh out, but I only want to highlight one important thing -- in this opinion, the Ninth Circuit basically held up Arizona's state bail laws and practices against the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Salerno and found those laws and practices lacking. This is a big deal, as I -- along with a number of others concerned with how bail has evolved in America -- have been preaching that the states have been ignoring the lessons of Salerno ever since it was issued. Accordingly, this is the first warning: if appellate courts begin to hold up state bail laws or practices -- such as blanket denials of bail without due process or detaining bailable defendants by using money -- against Salerno, then we're going to see a bunch of states having to change those laws and practices based on federal constitutional law.
The second case is State v. Brown, in which the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision to keep an unattainable financial condition of bond ($250,000) intact, and ordering the release of the defendant on non-monetary conditions. The number of fascinating quotes, cites, and other interesting parts of this opinion are too numerous to list, but a smattering include:equating the term "bail" to pretrial release, the only definition that can be defended legally and historically; citing to Duker, De Haas, Carbone, Freed & Wald, Beeley, Goldfarb, Thomas, and Foote to bolster the court's historical analysis; citing to Devine to explain how all other countries have avoided commercial sureties; citing to Pannel's "keys to the jail" quote; explaining the Manhattan Bail Project; citing to various important bail researchers, including Cohen & Reaves, VanNostrand, Goldkamp, Bechtel, Clark, Jones, & Levin; citing the American Bar Association Standards; explaining how analyzing bail in New Mexico starts with a determination of "bail" and "no bail;" quoting Stack v. Boyle for the requirement of individualization at bail; rejecting so-called "standard bonds;" quoting Bandy to say that setting a financial condition to detain would be unconstitutional; and quoting Justice Jackson's concurrence in Stack to remind judges that we must embrace the risk that is inherent in bail as the price of our system of justice. You really have to read this one to believe it, and especially the last paragraph, in which the court cautions judges to "faithfully honor the rule of law," whatever the consequences.
Brown signals a clear break from the kinds of bail opinions we've grown accustomed to in America. Here we have a state supreme court opinion that uses equal parts of bail’s history, the law, the pretrial research, and the national best-practice pretrial standards to articulate how, at least in New Mexico, setting bail arbitrarily, irrationally, or unfairly will no longer be tolerated. I expect more opinions like Brown in this generation of pretrial reform. And thus, this is the second warning: states that have grown averse to taking the risks that are inherent in America’s system of bail, or accustomed to bad pretrial practices like using “standard bail amounts,” setting money to protect public safety, setting money amounts with a purpose to detain bailable defendants, and basing the bail decision on single factor such as top charge, will likely be forced to change.
As a final point, consider this: in Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not send the case back to have the trial court set a different or a lower amount of money. In the end, the court ordered the defendant's release on no money whatsoever. It's a subtle point, but worth noting, that if a court, like this court, understands the fundamentals of bail, there won't be much room left for money.
I'll stick the two cases on my website, which you can find at www.clebp.org.
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